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Abstract
Every year housing markets in the United Kingdom and the United States experience sys-
tematic above-trend increases in both prices and transactions during the second and third
quarters (the hot season) and below-trend falls during the fourth and rst quarters (the
cold season). House price seasonality poses a challenge to existing models of the housing
market. To explain seasonal patterns, this paper develops a matching model that emphasizes
the role of match-specic quality between the buyer and the house and the presence of thick-
market e¤ects in housing markets. It shows that a small, deterministic driver of seasonality can
be amplied and revealed as deterministic seasonality in transactions and prices, quantitatively
mimicking the seasonal uctuations in transactions and prices observed in the United Kingdom
and the United States.
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1 Introduction
A rich empirical and theoretical literature has been motivated by dramatic boom-to-bust episodes in
regional and national housing markets.1 Booms are typically deﬁned as times when prices rise and
there is intense trading activity, whereas busts are periods when prices and trading activity fall below
trend.
While the boom-to-bust episodes motivating the extant work are relatively infrequent and their
timing is hard to predict, this paper shows that in several housing markets, booms and busts are just
as frequent and predictable as the seasons. Speciﬁcally, in most regions of the United Kingdom and
the United States, each year a housing boom of considerable magnitude takes place in the second and
third quarters of the calendar year (spring and summer, which we call the “hot season”), followed by
a bust in the fourth and ﬁrst quarters (fall and winter, the “cold season”).2 The predictable nature
of house price ﬂuctuations (and transactions) is conﬁrmed by real estate agents, who in conversations
with the authors observed that during the winter months there is less activity and prices are lower.
Perhaps more compelling, publishers of house price indexes go to great lengths to produce seasonally
adjusted versions of their indexes, usually the versions that are published in the media. As stated by
some publishers:
“House prices are higher at certain times of the year irrespective of the overall trend.
This tends to be in spring and summer... We seasonally adjust our prices because the time of
year has some inﬂuence. Winter months tend to see weaker price rises and spring/summer
see higher increases all other things being equal.” (From Nationwide House Price Index
Methodology.)
“House prices are seasonal with prices varying during the course of the year irrespective
of the underlying trend in price movements. For example, prices tend to be higher in the
spring and summer months.” (From Halifax Price Index Methodology.)
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to systematically document the existence and quantitative
importance of these seasonal booms and busts.3 For the United Kingdom as a whole, we ﬁnd that the
1For example, see Stein (1995), Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), Genesove and Mayer (2001), Krainer (2001), Brun-
nermeier and Julliard (2008), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), and the contributions cited therein.
2Since we use repeat-sale price indexes, changes in prices are not driven by changes in the characteristics of the
houses transacted.
3Studies on housing markets have typically glossed over the issue of seasonality. There are a few exceptions, albeit
they have been conﬁned to only one aspect of seasonality (e.g., either quantities or prices) or to a relatively small
geographical area. In particular, Goodman (1993) documents pronounced seasonality in moving patterns in the US,
Case and Shiller (1989) ﬁnd seasonality in Chicago house prices and–to a lesser extent–in Dallas. Hosios and Pesando
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diﬀerence in annualized growth rates between hot and cold seasons is 6.5 percent for nominal house
prices (5.5 percent for real prices) and 140 percent for the volume of transactions. For the United
States as a whole, the corresponding diﬀerences are above 4.6 percent for nominal (and real) prices
and 146 percent for transactions; US cities display higher seasonality, with diﬀerences in growth rates
of 6.7 percent for (real) prices and 152 percent for transactions.4
The predictability and size of seasonal ﬂuctuations in house prices pose a challenge to existing
models of the housing market. As we argue in the web Appendix, in those models, anticipated changes
in prices cannot be large: if prices are expected to be much higher in August than in December, then
optimizing buyers will try to shift their purchases to the end of the year, narrowing down the seasonal
price diﬀerential.5 ,6 Our paper tries to answer the question of why presumably informed buyers do not
try to buy in the lower-priced season and to shed light on the systematic seasonal pattern. (A lack of
scope for seasonal arbitrage does not necessarily imply that most transactions should be carried out
in one season nor that movements in prices and transactions should be correlated.) To oﬀer answers
to these questions, we develop a model for the housing market that more realistically captures the
process of buying and selling houses and can generate seasonal patterns quantitatively comparable to
those in the data.
The model builds on two elements of the housing market that we think are important for un-
derstanding seasonality in house prices. The ﬁrst element is a search friction. Buyers and sellers
potentially face two search frictions: one is locating a house for sale (or a potential buyer), and the
other is determining whether the house (once found) is suitable for the buyer (meaning it is a suf-
ﬁciently good match). The ﬁrst friction is, in our view, less relevant in the housing market context
because advertising by newspapers, real estate agencies, property web sites, and so on, can give suﬃ-
cient information to buyers in order to locate houses that ex ante are in the acceptance set. But houses
have many idiosyncratic features that can be valued diﬀerently by diﬀerent buyers: two individuals
(1991) ﬁnd seasonality in prices in the City of Toronto; the latter conclude “that individuals who are willing to purchase
against the seasonal will, on average, do considerably better.”
4The data for US cities corresponds to the 10-city Case-Shiller composite. Our focus on these two countries is largely
driven by the reliability and quality of the data.
5The issue is most evident in frictionless models, where prices reﬂect the present discounted value of a (presumably
long) stream of ﬂow values. Thus, seasonality in rental ﬂows or service costs has to be implausibly large to generate
seasonality in house prices. More recent models of the housing market allow for search and matching frictions that lead
to slightly more complex intertemporal non-arbitrage conditions and a somewhat modiﬁed relation between prices and
ﬂows. In the web Appendix, we study the canonical models in the literature and argue that these frictions alone cannot
account for the high seasonality in the data, calling for an additional mechanism to explain the seasonal patterns.
6We note that house price seasonality does not appear to be driven by liquidity related to overall income. Income
typically peaks in the last quarter, a period in which house prices and the volume of transactions fall below trend. There
is also a seasonal peak in output in the second quarter, and seasonal recessions in the ﬁrst and third quarters. (See
Beaulieu and Miron (1992) and Beaulieu, Miron, and MacKie-Mason (1992)). House price seasonality thus is not in line
with income seasonality: prices and transactions are above trend in the second and third quarters.
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visiting the same house may attach diﬀerent values to the property. We model this match-speciﬁc
quality as a stochastic variable that is fully revealed after the buyer inspects the house. The second
model’s element is the notion that in a market with more houses for sale, a buyer is more likely to ﬁnd
a better match–what we refer to as “thick-market eﬀect.”7 Speciﬁcally, we assume that in a market
with more houses, the distribution of match-speciﬁc quality ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the
distribution in a market with fewer houses.
Hence, our model starts from the premise that the utility potential buyers may derive from a house
is fully captured by the match-speciﬁc quality between the buyer and the house. This match-speciﬁc
quality is more likely to be higher in a market with more buyers and houses due to the thick-market
eﬀect. In a thick market (during the hot season), better matches are more likely to be formed and this
increases the probability that a transaction takes place, resulting in a higher volume of transactions.
Because better matches are formed, on average, prices will also be higher, provided that sellers have
some bargaining power. This mechanism leads to a higher number of transactions and prices in the
hot season when there are more buyers and sellers.
In the housing market this pattern is repetitive and systematic. The same half-year is a hot season
and the same half-year is a cold season. The higher match-speciﬁc quality in the hot season can account
for why potential buyers are willing to buy in the hot (high-price) season. But if our ampliﬁcation
mechanism is to explain seasonality, it has to answer two additional questions: one, why are some
sellers willing to sell in the cold (low-price) season? In other words, why is there no complete “time
agglomeration,” whereby markets shut down completely in a cold season? Two, why is the pattern
systematic–that is, why do hot and cold markets predictably alternate with the seasons?
To answer these two questions, we embedded the above mechanism into a seasonal model of the
housing market and study how a deterministic driver of seasonality can be ampliﬁed and revealed
as deterministic seasonality in transactions and prices due to the thick-market eﬀects on the match-
speciﬁc quality. By focusing on a periodic steady-state, we are studying a deterministic cycle in which
agents are fully aware that they are in a market in which both transactions and prices ﬂuctuate between
high and low levels across the two seasons.
Our answer to the ﬁrst question is related to the presence of search frictions in the form of match-
speciﬁc quality. In the cold season any seller can decide whether to sell immediately or wait until the
hot season, when presumably prospects might be more favorable on average. If a buyer then arrives
7The labor literature distinguishes the thick-market eﬀects due to a faster arrival of oﬀers and those due to the quality
of the match. Our focus is entirely on the quality eﬀect. See, for example, Diamond (1981), Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2006) and Gautier and Teulings (2008).
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and a match can be made, the seller has to decide whether to keep searching for a better oﬀer or to sell
at the potentially lower price. If he waits until the hot season, he can get, on average, a higher price,
provided that he ﬁnds a buyer with a good match. There is, however, a probability that he will not
ﬁnd such buyer to make a transaction; the uncertainty created by this search friction is not present in
a standard asset-pricing model, in which agents can always transact at market prices.
Our answer to the second question–why the hot and cold seasons are systematic–is related to
our assumption about the desire to move house and the seasonal variations embedded within this
decision. We claim that the arrival of the exogenous process by which households want to move (the
“propensity to move”) has a seasonal component. In the spring and summer months this propensity
is higher because, for example, of the school calendar: families with school-age children may prefer
to move in the summer, before their children start in new schools. These seasonal diﬀerences alone,
however, cannot explain the full extent of seasonality we document: in the data, seasonality in houses
for sale is much lower than seasonality in the volume of transactions; moreover, as Goodman (1993)
documents, parents of school-age children account for less than a third of total movers.8 Most of the
explanatory power of the model is due to the thick-market eﬀects on match-quality. We show that a
slightly higher ex ante probability of moving in a given season (which increases the number of buyers
and sellers) can trigger thick-market eﬀects that make it appealing to all other existing buyers and
sellers to transact in that season. This ampliﬁcation mechanism can thus create substantial seasonality
in the volume of transactions; the extent of seasonality in prices, in turn, increases with the bargaining
power of sellers. Intuitively better matches in the hot season imply higher surpluses to be shared
between buyers and sellers; to the extent that sellers have some bargaining power, this leads to higher
house prices in the hot season. The calibrated model can quantitatively account for most of the
seasonal ﬂuctuations in transactions and prices in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The contribution of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, it systematically documents
seasonal booms and busts in housing markets. Second, it develops a search-and-matching model that
can quantitatively account for the seasonal patterns of prices and transactions observed in the United
Kingdom and the United States. Understanding seasonality in house prices can serve as a ﬁrst step to
understanding how housing markets work and what the main mechanisms governing housing market
ﬂuctuations are. As such, it can help to put restrictions on the class of models needed to characterize
housing markets. In other words, seasonality in house prices, what economists and publishers of house
8While weather conditions may make house search more convenient in the summer, it is unlikely that this convenience
is worth so much money to the typical house buyer. Indeed, Goodman (1993) ﬁnds that seasonal moving patterns are
similar across diﬀerent regions. In addition, as we later report, cities with moderate weather throughout the year, such
as Los Angeles and San Diego, also display strong seasonality in prices and transactions.
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price indexes typically ignore or correct for, can contain relevant information to guide the development
and selection of appropriate models for housing markets. Our analysis points to the presence of thick-
and-thin market externalities; studying their interactions with other frictions at lower frequency might
be a fruitful avenue for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related theoretical literature and dis-
cusses how the thick-and-thin market channel diﬀers from and complements alternative explanations
of housing market ﬂuctuations. Section 3 presents the motivating empirical evidence and section 4
introduces the model. Section 5 presents the qualitative results and a quantitative analysis of the
model; it then discusses additional implications of the model. Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
The web Appendix presents supplementary empirical evidence supporting the model. It then studies
the existing canonical models of the housing market and argues that they cannot account for the sea-
sonality observed in the data. Next, it describes the eﬃciency properties of the model and generalizes
the framework to study its robustness to diﬀerent modelling assumptions; in particular it allows for
diﬀerential moving costs as alternative triggers of seasonality; it studies diﬀerent assumptions regard-
ing the observability of the match quality, and diﬀerent pricing mechanisms (including price posting by
sellers). Finally, the web Appendix provides detailed micro-foundations for the thick-and thin-market
eﬀects. All analytical derivations and proofs are also collected in the web Appendix.
2 Related Theoretical Literature
The search-and-matching framework has been applied before to the study of housing markets (for
example, see Wheaton (1990), Williams (1995), Krainer (2001), and Albrecht et al. (2007)). Recent
work on housing market ﬂuctuations, such as Novy-Marx (2009), Diaz and Jerez (2012) and Piazzesi
and Schneider (2009), adopt an aggregate matching function (as in Pissarides (2000)) and focus on the
role of market tightness (the ratio of the number of buyers to the number of sellers) in determining
the probability of transactions taking place. These papers study the ampliﬁed response of housing
markets to an unexpected shock. We instead focus on predictable cycles, with both sellers and buyers
being fully aware of being in such periodic cycle. We distinguish the probability of making a contact
and the probability that the house turns out to be a good match. The contact probability is always
one in our model, but the match quality drawn is a random variable. In this sense, our setup is
closest to Jovanovic (1979), which also emphasizes the stochastic nature of the match-speciﬁc quality
for the labour market, and Krainer (2001) for the housing market. In contrast to previous models that
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focus on market tightness, transactions and prices in our set-up are governed by the distribution of
match-speciﬁc quality.
Our paper complements the seminal work by Krainer (2001) and Novy-Marx (2009), by highlighting
a new mechanism that can account for some of the regularities observed in housing markets. Both
Krainer (2001) and Novy-Marx (2009) also refer to “hot and cold” markets; however, in both studies
the nature as well as the meaning of hot and cold markets is diﬀerent than in our paper. The key idea
in Novy-Marx (2009) is that, if for any reason the ratio of buyers to sellers (tightness) unexpectedly
increases, houses can sell more quickly, decreasing the stock of sellers in the market. This in turn
increases the relative number of buyers to sellers even more, amplifying the initial shock. As a result,
the outside option of sellers improves, leading to higher prices. Thus, the entire ampliﬁcation eﬀect
operates through market tightness. In our model, instead, market tightness plays no role; indeed,
it is constant across all seasons. If an agent receives a shock that forces her to move, she becomes
a potential buyer and a potential seller simultaneously and overall tightness does not change. The
ampliﬁcation mechanism in our model comes instead from the quality of the matches. In the hot
season there are both more buyers and more sellers; the availability of a bigger stock of houses for
sale improves the overall eﬃciency of the market, as buyers are more likely to ﬁnd a better match.
Put diﬀerently, our explanation relies on market thickness (the numbers of buyers and sellers) and
its eﬀect on the quality of matches, whereas Novy-Marx’s hinges on tightness. This diﬀerence leads
to crucially diﬀerent predictions for the correlation between prices and transactions. In Novy-Marx
(2009), the number of transactions in the housing market is not necessarily higher when prices are
high. His model generates a positive correlation between prices and tightness, but not necessarily a
positive correlation between prices and the volume of transactions, which is one of the salient features
of housing markets (Stein 1995). Speciﬁcally, in Novy-Marx (2009), a large increase in the number of
sellers and buyers that does not alter tightness would not alter prices at all, even if it substantially
increases the number of transactions. Similarly, in his model, a decline in the number of sellers
leads to an increase in tightness, lower volume of transactions, and higher prices, thus generating a
negative comovement between prices and transactions. Instead, our model always generates a positive
correlation between prices and transactions. As Wheaton (1990) has pointed out, moving houses most
of the time means both selling a house and buying another one and hence, in this context, a model
in which tightness plays a subdued role is appealing. In our model, a hot market is one with high
prices, more buyers and sellers, and an unambiguously larger number of transactions.9 Of course, in
9As Novy-Marx (2009), our model has predictions for average time on the market (TOM). Speciﬁcally, the model
predicts that a house put up for sale in the cold season will take longer to sell. There is a diﬀerence, however, between
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practice tightness and thickness of the market can operate simultaneously, and their role might vary
at diﬀerent frequencies. In this sense, our paper complements Novy-Marx (2009) and the existing
literature focusing on tightness.
In our paper, “hot-and-cold markets” also are diﬀerent from those in Krainer (2001), who studies
the response of housing markets to an aggregate shock that aﬀects the fundamental value of houses–
his model cannot generate quantitatively meaningful ﬂuctuations in prices unless the aggregate shock
is very persistent. A deterministic cycle in Krainer’s model is equivalent to setting the persistence
parameter to zero, in which case his model predicts virtually no ﬂuctuation in prices. Our set-up is
diﬀerent from Krainer (2001) in that it brings in thick-market eﬀects which, due to their ampliﬁcation,
are able to generate quantitatively large ﬂuctuations in transactions and prices.10 In the web Appendix
we expand on this point and argue that in the absence of a thick-market eﬀect, existing models of the
housing market are unable to account for the seasonality in the data.
Finally, we follow the literature (for example, see Wheaton 1990 and Krainer 2001) by assuming
exogenous moving shocks. This essentially abstracts from the decision to dissolve a match, which would
potentially require a role for school enrollments, marriages, job changes, and other socioeconomic
determinants outside our model. The main potential contribution of allowing endogenous moving
decision is to account for the seasonality in vacancies (homes for sale). Since we do not have data
that is more fundamental (e.g. seasonality in shocks that change the match quality) than the observed
seasonality in vacancies, we do not attempt to predict the seasonality in vacancies. Instead, in the
calibration, we choose to match the seasonality in vacancies observed in the data, and study its eﬀects
on prices and transactions; thus the potential ampliﬁcation mechanism through the endogenous moving
decision is already embedded in the seasonality in vacancy.
3 Hot and Cold Seasons in the Data
In this section we study seasonality in housing markets in the United Kingdom and the United States
at diﬀerent levels of aggregation. The focus on these two countries is due to the availability of constant-
our mechanism and that in models emphasizing tightness. Our model predicts higher probability of a transaction and
shorter average TOM for both buyers and sellers in the hot season. (We emphasize that the prediction is about the
correlation between average time on the market and prices over time, not across sellers–or buyers–within a time
period. See, for example, Krainer, 2001, and Diaz and Jerez, 2012.) Models that focus on market tightness predict an
inverse relation between buyer’s and seller’s TOM (average TOM is short for buyers but long for sellers when tightness
is high). Instead, our model predicts they move in the same direction. Empirical studies focus on sellers’ TOM, largely
because data on buyers’ TOM is less easily observed. This prediction could potentially be tested empirically, as more
data on the buyer’s side are gathered.
10Unlike Krainer (2001), we also model the endogenous evolution of the number of vacancies and buyers over time.
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quality house price series.11 As already noted, publishers of house price indexes produce both seasonally
adjusted (SA) and non-seasonally adjusted (NSA) series. This is also the case for transactions. In
our analysis, we use exclusively the (raw) NSA series to compute the extent of seasonality.12 In what
follows, we ﬁrst describe the data sources and assess the degree of seasonality in the data. Next,
we discuss the behavior other variables related to the housing market. Finally, we provide empirical
evidence motivating the mechanism we propose.
3.1 Data
United Kingdom
As a source for house price data, we use the repeat-price index based on Case-Shiller (1987)’s
method, produced by the Land Registry for England and Wales. The repeat-sale index measures
average price changes in repeat sales of the same properties; as such, the index is designed to control
for the characteristics of the homes sold.13 The index is constructed at diﬀerent levels of geographic
aggregation and starts in 1995:Q1. In the interest of space, we discuss here the results for the main
planning regions and in the web Appendix we report the results at ﬁner levels of disaggregation.14 To
compute real price indexes, we later deﬂate the house price indexes using the NSA retail price index
(RPI) provided by the U.K. Oﬃce for National Statistics.
For transactions, we use the data on sales volumes also published by the Land Registry.
United States
We use two sources for house prices in the United States. The ﬁrst is the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA), which took over the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; we focus on the
11Constant-quality indexes mitigate concerns with compositional changes in the types of houses transacted across
seasons. Results for other countries show qualitatively similar seasonal patterns, but we are less conﬁdent about the
comparability of the data.
12In the web Appendix we show the implied seasonal patterns based on the publishers’ in-house adjustments.
13The approach signiﬁcantly limits the extent to which changes in the composition of the sample of houses transacted
can inﬂuence the price index. Speciﬁcally, using information on the values of the same physical units at two points in
time controls for diﬀerences in housing attributes across properties in the sample.
14Ther are two other sources providing quality-adjusted NSA house price indexes: one is the Department of Commu-
nities and Local Government and the other is Halifax, one of the country’s largest mortgage lenders. Both sources report
regional price indexes based on hedonic regressions. The results are consistent across all sources (see web Appendix.)
Other house price publishers, such as the Nationwide Building Society (NBS), report quality adjusted data but they are
already SA (the NSA data are not publicly available). The NBS, however, reports in its methodology description that
June is generally the strongest month for house prices and January is the weakest; this justiﬁes the seasonal adjustment
they perform in the published series. In a somewhat puzzling paper, Rosenthal (2006) argues that seasonality in the
NBS data is elusive; we could not, however, gain access to the NSA data to assess which of the two conﬂicting assess-
ments (the NBS’s or Rosenthal’s) was correct. We should perhaps also mention that Rosenthal (2006) also reaches very
diﬀerent conclusions from Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) with regards to lower-frequency movements.
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repeat-sale purchase-only index, which starts in 1991:Q1. The second source is Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) Case-Shiller price series for major U.S. cities, which starts in 1987:Q1. To compute real price
indexes, we use the NSA consumer price index (CPI) provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.15
Data on the number of transactions at the regional level come from the National Association of
Realtors (NAR), and correspond to the number of sales of existing single-family homes. Data for U.S.
cities come from S&P and correspond to sales pair counts on which the repeat-price index is based.
3.2 Extent of Seasonality
We focus our study on deterministic seasonality, which is easier to understand (and to predict) for
buyers and sellers (unlikely to be all econometricians), and hence most puzzling from a theoretical
point of view. In the United Kingdom and the United States, prices and transactions in both the
second and third quarters are above trend, while in both ﬁrst and fourth quarters they are below
trend. For ease of exposition, we group data into two broadly deﬁned seasons–second and third
quarter, or “hot season,” and fourth and ﬁrst quarter, or “cold season.” (We use interchangeably the
terms “hot season” and “summer” to refer to the second and third quarters and “cold season” and
“winter” to refer to the ﬁrst and fourth quarters.)
In the next set of ﬁgures, we depict in dark (red) bars the average (annualized) price increase from
winter to summer, ln
(
PS
PW
)2
, where PS is the price index at the end of the hot season and PW is
the price at the end of the cold season. Correspondingly, we depict in light (blue) bars the average
(annualized) price increase from summer to winter ln
(
PW ′
PS
)2
, where PW ′ is the price index at the end
of the cold season in the following year. We plot similar ﬁgures for transactions.
The extent of seasonality for each geographical unit can then be measured as the diﬀerence between
the two bars. This measure nets out lower-frequency ﬂuctuations aﬀecting both seasons. In the model
we later present, we use a similar metric to gauge the extent of seasonality.
3.2.1 Housing Market Seasonality in the United Kingdom
Nominal and Real House Prices
Figure 1 reports the average annualized percent price increases in the summer and winter from 1996
through to 2012 using the regional price indexes provided by the Land Registry. During the period
analyzed, the average nominal price increases in the winter were around 3 percent in all regions except
15There is little seasonality in the U.S. CPI, a ﬁnding ﬁrst documented by Barsky and Miron (1989), and hence the
seasonal patterns in nominal and real housing prices coincide.
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for London. In the summer, the average growth rates were above 8 percent in all regions, except for
the North East and North West. As shown in the graph, the diﬀerences in growth rates across the two
broad seasons are generally very large and economically signiﬁcant, with an average of 6.5 percent for
all regions. Similar seasonal patterns emerge with other sources of constant-quality prices going back
to 1983.16 While the average growth rates diﬀer across diﬀerent time periods, the seasonal pattern
appears extremely robust.
Figure 1: Average Annualized House Price Changes in Summer and Winter, by Region
The seasonal pattern of real house prices (that is, house prices relative to the NSA aggregate
price index) depends also on the seasonality of aggregate inﬂation. In the United Kingdom, overall
price inﬂation during this period displayed a small degree of seasonality. The diﬀerence in overall
inﬂation rates across the two seasons, however, can hardly “undo” the diﬀerences in nominal house
price inﬂation, implying a signiﬁcant degree of seasonality also in real house prices (see Figure A2 in
the web Appendix). Netting out the eﬀect of overall inﬂation reduces the diﬀerences in growth rates
between winters and summers to a country-wide average of 5.5 percent.17
Number of Transactions
Seasonal ﬂuctuations in house prices are accompanied by qualitatively similar ﬂuctuations in the
16See also Figure A1 in the web Appendix for results based on alternative sources.
17We also looked at more disaggregated data, using the Halifax series, distinguishing between ﬁrst-time buyers and
former-owner occupiers, as well as purchases of newly built houses versus existing houses. Seasonal patterns are qualita-
tively similar across the various groups, but tend to be quantitatively stronger for former-owner occupiers and existing
houses. The results are reported in Table A1 in the web Appendix.
Our model, by abstracting from construction, will speak more directly to the evidence on existing houses, and, as it
will become clear, former-owner occupiers.
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number of transactions, as illustrated in Figure 2.18 As the ﬁgure shows, the number of transactions
increases sharply in the summer term and accordingly declines in the winter term. The average
diﬀerence in growth rates during this period, our metric for seasonality) was 139 percent.
Figure 2: Average Annualized Changes in Transactions in Summer and Winter, by Region
3.2.2 Statistical Signiﬁcance of the Diﬀerences between Summer and Winter
We test the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in growth rates across seasons,[
ln
(
PS
PW
)2
− ln
(
PW ′
PS
)2]
, using a t-test on the equality of means.19 Table 1 reports the average dif-
ferences in growth rates across seasons and standard errors, together with the statistical signiﬁcance.
The ﬁrst two columns show the results for seasonality in nominal house prices; the third and fourth
columns show the corresponding results for real house prices and the last two columns show the results
for the volume of sales.20 The diﬀerences in price changes across seasons are quite sizable for most
18A diﬀerent dataset from the Council of Mortgage Lenders going back to 1983 (and to 1974 for some regions) show
similar seasonal patterns. See Figure A3 in the web Appendix.
19The test on the equality of means is equivalent to the t-test on the slope coeﬃcient from a regression of annualized
growth rates on a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation falls on the second and third quarter and 0
otherwise. The dummy coeﬃcient captures the annualized diﬀerence across the two seasons, regardless of the frequency
of the data (provided growth rates are annualized). To see this note that the annualized growth rate in, say, the
hot season, ln
(
PS
PW
)2
, is equal to the average of annualized quarterly growth rates in the summer term: ln
(
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)2
=
2 ln
(
P3
P1
)
= 12
[
4 ln
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)
+ 4 ln
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)]
, where the subindices indicate the quarter, and, correspondingly, 2 ln
(
P1′
P3
)
=
1
2
[
4 ln
(
P1′
P4
)
+ 4 ln
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)]
. Hence a regression with quarterly (or semester) data on a summer dummy will produce an
unbiased estimate of the average diﬀerence in growth rates across seasons. We use quarterly data to exploit all the
information and gain on degrees of freedom.
20Tables A2a and A2b in the web Appendix shows the results at geographically more disaggregated levels and Table
A3 shows the corresponding information at the regional level using aternative datasets.
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regions, in the order of 6 to 7 percent on average in nominal terms and 5 to 6 percent on average in
real terms; from a statistical point of view, the results are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level (or lower).
For transactions, the diﬀerences reach 139 percent for the country as a whole, and are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Taken together, the data point to a strong seasonal cycle in all
regions, with a large increase in transactions and prices during the summer relative to the winter.
Table 1: Diﬀerence in Annualized Percentage Changes in U.K. House Prices
and Transactions between Summer and Winter, by Region 1996-2012
Nominal house price Real house price Volume of Sales
Region Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
England & Wales 6.472*** (2.272) 5.547** (2.489) 139.249*** (15.603)
North East 6.439** (2.874) 5.514* (3.092) 134.992*** (17.647)
North West 5.897** (2.528) 4.972* (2.734) 128.950*** (15.864)
Yorks & Humber 6.683** (2.595) 5.757** (2.806) 136.786*** (16.588)
East Midlands 6.473** (2.497) 5.548** (2.708) 139.083*** (16.572)
West Midlands 5.686** (2.290) 4.761* (2.515) 135.452*** (15.745)
Wales 7.346*** (2.579) 6.420** (2.809) 133.254*** (16.580)
East 6.050** (2.412) 5.125* (2.604) 144.768*** (16.116)
London 7.129*** (2.467) 6.204** (2.624) 124.953*** (14.981)
South East 6.336** (2.413) 5.410** (2.592) 152.763*** (15.740)
South West 6.798*** (2.507) 5.873** (2.709) 150.323*** (16.772)
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors), by region for 1995-2012.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Source: Land Registry Repeat Sale Index.
Housing Market Seasonality in the United States
Nominal and Real House Prices
Figure 3 illustrates the annualized nominal house price increases for diﬀerent regions from FHFA
and Figure 4 shows the plot using the S&P’s Case-Shiller indexes for major cities. As shown, for most
US regions the seasonal pattern is qualitatively similar to that in the United Kingdom, albeit the
extent of seasonality is somewhat smaller averaging 4.6 percent for nominal prices and 4.8 percent for
real prices. For some of the major U.S. cities, however, the degree of seasonality is comparable to and
even higher than that in the United Kingdom, as illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 3: Average Annualized U.S. House Price Increases in Summer and Winter, by Region
Figure 4: Average Annualized U.S. House Price Changes in Summer and Winter, by City
Transactions
Figure 5 shows the annualized growth rates in the number of transactions from 1991 through to
2012 for main census regions; the data come from National Association of Realtors (NAR).21 As was
the case for the United Kingdom, the seasonality of US transactions is overwhelming: the volume of
21The series actually starts in 1989, but we use 1991 for comparability with the FHFA-census-level division price
series; adding these two years does not change the results.
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sales rises sharply in the summer and falls in the winter.
Figure 5: U.S. Average Annualized Increases in Transactions in Summer and Winter, by Region
Figure 6: U.S. Average Annualized Changes in Transactions in Summer and Winter, by City
Statistical Signiﬁcance of the Diﬀerences between Summer and Winter
We summarize the diﬀerences in growth rates across seasons and report the results from a test on
mean diﬀerences in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows the results for prices using FHFA’s Census-division
levels and for transactions using NAR’s Census-level data. Table 3 shows the results using S&P’s
Case-Shiller city-level data on prices and transactions.
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Table 2: Diﬀerence in Annualized Percentage Changes in U.S. House Prices
and Transactions between Summer and Winter, by Region, 1991-2012
Nominal house price Real house price Volume of Sales
Region Division Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
USA USA 4.632*** (1.532) 4.828*** (0.324) 146.460*** (13.704)
Mountain 4.081* (2.278) 4.437*** (0.285)
Pacific 4.747 (3.053) 4.982*** (0.298)
East North Central 6.283*** (1.332) 6.493*** (0.616)
West North Central 5.540*** (1.117) 5.592*** (0.379)
Middle Atlantic 5.281*** (1.579) 5.514*** (0.181)
New England 5.433*** (1.892) 5.818*** (0.315)
East South Central 3.380*** (1.070) 3.721*** (0.475)
South Atlantic 3.307* (1.946) 3.449*** (0.332)
West South Central 3.635*** (0.763) 3.668*** (0.196)
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors), by region for 1991:Q1-2012:Q1. *Significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Sources: For prices, FHFA Purchase Only Repeat Sale Index. For volume, NAR Existing
single family home sales series.
(15.735)
156.499*** (11.181)
152.671*** (13.038)
West
Mid West
North East
South
120.458*** (15.934)
156.637***
Table 3: Diﬀerence in Annualized Percentage Changes in U.S. House Prices
and Transactions between Summer and Winter, by City, 1987-2012
Nominal house price Real house price Volume of Sales
City Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
AZ-Phoenix 4.817 (3.229) 3.575 (3.208) 111.580*** (10.186)
CA-Los Angeles 8.398*** (2.768) 7.177** (2.781) 113.885*** (10.824)
CA-San Diego 8.039*** (2.581) 6.818*** (2.583) 120.378*** (13.264)
CA-San Francisco 11.485*** (2.925) 10.264*** (2.875) 147.059*** (10.884)
CO-Denver 8.435*** (1.296) 7.214*** (1.336) 189.180*** (8.811)
DC-Washington 9.087*** (2.045) 7.866*** (2.037) 187.102*** (7.376)
FL-Miami 2.234 (2.620) 1.013 (2.637) 116.339*** (7.193)
FL-Tampa 4.831** (2.201) 3.61 (2.184) 119.349*** (8.108)
GA-Atlanta 9.233*** (2.057) 7.878*** (1.993) 155.706*** (10.020)
IL-Chicago 10.039*** (1.894) 8.818*** (1.921) 216.916*** (11.983)
MA-Boston 10.799*** (1.519) 9.577*** (1.617) 237.146*** (6.763)
MI-Detroit 8.118*** (2.547) 6.763** (2.579) 164.965*** (24.750)
MN-Minneapolis 9.780*** (2.363) 8.538*** (2.413) 100.873*** (19.367)
NC-Charlotte 6.081*** (0.989) 4.860*** (0.888) 183.521*** (11.357)
NV-Las Vegas 4.875 (3.077) 3.654 (3.057) 109.396*** (15.120)
NY-New York 5.846*** (1.641) 4.625*** (1.751) 163.048*** (10.150)
OH-Cleveland 10.354*** (1.214) 9.133*** (1.211) 235.867*** (10.829)
OR-Portland 7.787*** (1.683) 6.566*** (1.592) 173.961*** (11.023)
TX-Dallas 11.925*** (1.552) 9.671*** (1.478) 173.849*** (19.268)
WA-Seattle 10.201*** (1.902) 8.882*** (1.875) 161.596*** (11.479)
Composite-10 7.955*** (1.918) 6.734*** (1.952) 152.570*** (6.476)
Composite-20 10.261*** (3.263) 8.007** (3.296) 154.212*** (7.801)
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors), by region for 1987-2012. *Significant
at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Sources: S&P Case-Shiller Price Index and Sales pair
counts. Some of the series start after 1987. The composite-20 index starts only in 2000.
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For the United States as a whole, the diﬀerences in annualized growth rates in nominal prices
are in the order of 4.6 percent (4.8 percent for real prices) and statistically signiﬁcant at standard
levels. There is some variation across regions, with some displaying low seasonality (South) and others
(Mid West and North East) displaying signiﬁcant levels of seasonality. Interestingly, the Case-Shiller
index for U.S. cities displays even higher levels of seasonality, comparable to and even higher than the
levels observed in UK regions, with some variation across cities. The 10-city composite index shows a
statistically signiﬁcant seasonality of 7.2 percent for nominal prices and 6.7 percent for real prices.
The seasonality in the volume of transactions is comparable to (or higher than) that in the United
Kingdom, with an average diﬀerence in growth rates across seasons of 146 percent for the US as a
whole and of 152.6 percent for the 10-city composite.
3.3 Other housing variables and cross-market comparisons
As part of our study of house markets, we also analyzed data on rental prices, but we were unable to
identify a seasonal pattern in either country.22 This is in line with anecdotal evidence suggesting that
rents are sticky. Similarly, interest rates did not exhibit a seasonal pattern in the last four decades of
data.23 In the interest of space, we do not report the results in the paper. In the model we present
later, we will work under the assumption that rents and interest rates are aseasonal.
The data description makes it evident that seasonal cycles are present across most of the United
Kingdom and the United States, although with some heterogeneity with regards to intensity. In
particular, though most U.S. cities display strong seasonality, cities such as Miami and Las Vegas
show little (or statistically insigniﬁcant) variation over the season. Given the data limitations (20
observations on price seasonality corresponding to the cities in the Case-Shiller data), it would be
virtually impossible to draw causal links from the potential triggers of seasonality because winters are
22We studied the average registered private rents collected by U.K. Housing and Construction Statistics. We run
regressions using as dependent variables both the rent levels and the log of rents on a dummy variable taking a value
of 1 in the second and third quarters and 0 otherwise, detrending the data in diﬀerent ways. We found no evidence
of deterministic seasonality. For the United States, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides two series that can
serve as proxies: one is the NSA series of owner’s equivalent rent and the second is the NSA rent of primary residence;
both series are produced for the construction of the CPI and correspond to averages over all U.S. cities. For each series,
we run similar regressions as for the UK. The results yielded no discernible pattern of seasonality. We take this as only
suggestive as, of course, the data are not as clean and detailed as we would wish.
23We investigated seasonality in diﬀerent interest rate series published by the Bank of England: the repo (base) rate,
an average interest rate charged by the four major U.K. banks before the crisis (Barclays Bank, Lloyds Bank, HSBC,
and National Westminster Bank), and a weighted average standard variable mortgage rate from banks and Building
Societies. None of the interest rate series displays seasonality. For the United States, we studied data on mortgage
rates produced by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, corresponding to contract interest rates on
commitments for ﬁxed-rate ﬁrst mortgages; the data are quarterly averages beginning in 1972 and the original data are
collected by Freddie Mac. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Barsky and Miron (1989) and the evidence from the United
Kingdom, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant deterministic seasonality.
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mild in these cities and there is a larger population of elderly people, factors which are intimately
related. We note, though, that the mildness of a winter per se does not straightforwardly predict
aseasonality, as cities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, or San Francisco display strong seasonality
in prices, despite their benign weather. A perhaps more likely trigger of seasonality is the school
calendar.24 As noted earlier, however, only a small portion of the population of potential home buyers
have school-age children.25 One of the model’s implications is that even slight diﬀerences in the
“fundamentals” of the seasons have the potential to trigger thick-market eﬀects with large swings in
the volume of transactions and prices. Hence, in equilibrium, most people end up transacting in the
summer. This is consistent with the data, illustrated in Figure A4 in the web Appendix, which shows
that people in diﬀerent life-cycle stages (not just parents of school age children) tend to move in the
summer–a regularity originally noted by Goodman (1991).
We also note that U.S. cities tend to display more seasonality than the United States as a whole, a
pattern that, as we shall explain, can be rationalized by our model. In particular, the model predicts
that there should be more price seasonality in markets in which sellers have higher bargaining power.
The cross-city evidence appears consistent with this prediction in that price seasonality is positively
correlated with the price-to-rent ratio (which, in turn increases with the degree of bargaining power
in our model).26
Some may argue that cities by their sheer size, are likely to be “thicker” throughout the year
and hence seasonal diﬀerences in thickness are relatively unimportant. Anecdotal evidence, however,
suggests that even within cities, housing markets can be highly segmented, as people tend to search
in relatively narrow neighborhoods and geographic areas (e.g., to be close to school, jobs, families).
Thus, for example, London or Washington DC as a whole are not the relevant sizes of the local housing
market, and it would be improper to use these cities as boundaries to deﬁne market thickness (e.g.,
for those familiar with London’s geography and social structure, people searching in South Kensington
will never search in the East End). In other words, seemingly large cities may mask a collection
of relatively smaller and segmented housing markets that can see signiﬁcant changes in thickness
throughout the year. A limitation of the data is hence that we cannot meaningfully compare thickness
across geographic units.
Finally, we note that seasonality appears to be slightly higher during the recent crisis, although
24There is a positive correlation between seasonality and the ratio of school age children to elderly people in a city.
However, the results seems entirely driven by Miami and Tampa.
25The fraction of movers with children between 6 and 17 years old is 0.22 according to the American Housing Survey
1999.
26The correlation between seasonality and the price-to-rent ratio in the data is about 0.3. Data on Price-to-rent ratios
come from the 2009 New York Times index.
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it is too early to draw general conclusions. As we gather more data (and cycles) over time, we may
be able to discern whether this is indeed a systematic pattern. This would be consistent with our
model: during cyclical busts, the incentives to transact during the summer (the thick market) are even
stronger, as the chances to ﬁnd a better match are relatively higher.
3.4 Match Quality and Seasons in the Data
The key idea at the core of the model we propose is that, due to the thick-market eﬀect, the average
quality of matches formed in the summer is higher than in the winter. We use individual household
data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) to check the empirical plausibility of this idea. Though
the quality of the match is house-owner speciﬁc and not directly observable to the econometrician, we
consider three proxies that should be correlated with it.
The ﬁrst proxy is the duration of the match. The premise is that, in practice, if the house is a good
ﬁt for the household, the household will tend to stay longer; in other words, the duration of stay should
be indicative of the quality of the match. (In the labour literature the duration of the employment
relationship is often used as a proxy for the quality of the match.) We hence ask whether in the data,
matches formed in the hot season tend to last longer. And we ﬁnd that this indeed the case. The
results are summarized in Table 4, which shows (poisson) regressions of the number of years of stay
on a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the household head moved in the summer season. (The
results are similar if we use instead the season in which the house was bought.)27 As the table shows,
on average, the duration of stay increases by 3.3 to 4.3 percent when households move in the summer.
The results are robust to a number of controls, including the age of the house, the family income, the
size of the household, the number of households older than 18, as well as regional ﬁxed eﬀects, the
urban/suburban/rural status of the location and the heating and cooling degree days.
As a second (inverse) proxy for the quality of the match, we consider the number of repairs and
additions made to a house during the ﬁrst two years after its purchase, which we interpret as inversely
related to the quality of the original match. We then ask whether the number of repairs and alterations
depends on the season in which the match was formed. The results are summarized in Table 5, which
shows (poisson) regressions of the number of repairs and alterations on a dummy variable which takes
the value one if the household head moved in the summer. Consistent with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd
that the number of repairs and additions is about 10 percent lower when the household moved in the
27The regressions use data on households for which we observe a full duration spell–that is, households who report
the date of the last move and the date of the move previous to that. The data correspond to the AHS 1999.
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summer than when the household moved in the winter (as before, using the season in which the house
was bought does not alter the results). The regression results are robust to the same geographic,
house- and household-speciﬁc characteristics described above.
Finally, and related to the previous idea, we use as third proxy the cost of repairs and additions
incurred on a house during the ﬁrst two years after its purchase, which we also interpret as an inverse
proxy for the quality of the match. The results are described in Table 6. We ﬁnd that on average,
the cost of repairs and alterations (relative to the value of the house) are 15 percent lower when the
househodl moved in the summer.28
In all, the micro evidence appears consistent with the idea that matches formed in the summer
tend to be of better quality.
Table 4. Duration of the Match and Season in which Match was Formed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Moved into unit in the Summer 0.035* 0.033* 0.033* 0.034* 0.037* 0.041** 0.043** 0.043**
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Year unit was built 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Family income (in US$1,000) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of Persons in household 0.034*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.059***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Number of adults +18 in household -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Central city/suburban status fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average heating/cooling degree days controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
CMSA fixed effects No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 6,885 6,885 6,885 6,885 6,885 6,885 6,885 6,885
Dependent variable: length of stay (in years)
Note: Poisson regression. The dependent variable is the duration of stay (in years). Moved into unit in the Summer takes the value 1 if
household head moved in the spring or summer (in the previous move). Sample includes all respondents for whom we observe a full
duration spell. Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Central city/suburban status categories: 1)
central city of MSA; 2) inside MSA, but not in central city-urban; 3) inside MSA, but not in central city-rural; 4) outside MSA, urban; 5)
outside MSA, rural. Heating/cooling degree days categories: 1) Coldest: 7,001+ heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling degree days; 2)
Cold: 5,500-7,000 heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling degree days; 3) Cool: 4,000-5,499 heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling
degree days; 4) Mild: < 4,000 heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling degree days; 5) Mixed: 2,000-3,999 heating degree days and 2,000+
cooling degree days; 6) Hot: < 2,000 heating degree days and 2,000+ cooling degree days.
28Since the regressions in Table 6 are in logs, the summer eﬀect is obtained as: −15% = [exp(−0.17)− 1] ∗ 100%.
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Table 5. Number of Repairs and Alterations and Season in which Match was Formed
Moved into unit in the Summer -0.102** -0.108** -0.110** -0.110** -0.112** -0.110** -0.114** -0.109**
[0.047] [0.046] [0.045] [0.046] [0.046] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045]
Year unit was built -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Family income (in US$1,000) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of Persons in household 0.042** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.057***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
Number of adults +18 in household -0.044 -0.04 -0.039 -0.04
[0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035]
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Central city/suburban status fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average heating/cooling degree days controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
CMSA fixed effects No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 5,982 5,982 5,982 5,982 5,982 5,982 5,982 5,982
Dependent variable: Number of repairs an alterations within two years after move relative to property value
Note: Poisson regression. The dependent variable is the number of repairs and alterations within the last two years relative to the property
value. Sample includes all respondents who moved in or after 1997. Moved into unit in the Summer takes the value 1 if household head moved
in the spring or summer (in the last move). Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Central
city/suburban status categories: 1) central city of MSA; 2) inside MSA, but not in central city-urban; 3) inside MSA, but not in central city-rural;
4) outside MSA, urban; 5) outside MSA, rural. Heating/cooling degree days categories: 1) Coldest: 7,001+ heating degree days and < 2,000
cooling degree days; 2) Cold: 5,500-7,000 heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling degree days; 3) Cool: 4,000-5,499 heating degree days and <
2,000 cooling degree days; 4) Mild: < 4,000 heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling degree days; 5) Mixed: 2,000-3,999 heating degree days
and 2,000+ cooling degree days; 6) Hot: < 2,000 heating degree days and 2,000+ cooling degree days.
Table 6. Costs of Repairs and Alterations and Season in which Match was Formed
Moved into unit in the Summer -0.179** -0.188*** -0.185*** -0.181** -0.181** -0.173** -0.168** -0.178**
[0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.070] [0.070] [0.071]
Year unit was built -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Family income (in US$1,000) -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Number of Persons in household -0.052** -0.058* -0.061** -0.058* -0.063**
[0.025] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
Number of adults +18 in household 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.023
[0.067] [0.068] [0.067] [0.067]
Region fixed effects 3051 3051 3051 3051 3051 3051 3051 3051
Central city/suburban status fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average heating/cooling degree days controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
CMSA fixed effects No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051
Dependent variable: (log) of cost of repairs an alterations within two years after move relative to property value
Note: The dependent variable is the (log of the) costs of repairs and alterations within the last two years relative to the property value. Sample
includes all respondents who moved in or after 1997. Moved into unit in the Summer takes the value 1 if household head moved in the spring or
summer (in the last move). Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Central city/suburban status
categories: 1) central city of MSA; 2) inside MSA, but not in central city-urban; 3) inside MSA, but not in central city-rural; 4) outside MSA,
urban; 5) outside MSA, rural. Heating/cooling degree days categories: 1) Coldest: 7,001+ heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling degree days;
2) Cold: 5,500-7,000 heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling degree days; 3) Cool: 4,000-5,499 heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling degree
days; 4) Mild: < 4,000 heating degree days and < 2,000 cooling degree days; 5) Mixed: 2,000-3,999 heating degree days and 2,000+ cooling
degree days; 6) Hot: < 2,000 heating degree days and 2,000+ cooling degree days.
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4 A Search-and-Matching Model for the Housing Market
We have mentioned that the predictability and size of the seasonal variation in house prices pose a
challenge to existing models of the housing market. In the web Appendix we study the canonical
models in the literature and argue that they cannot account for the seasonality we see in the data,
calling for a diﬀerent mechanism to explain seasonal patterns. In this section we develop a search-
and-matching model for the housing market with two key elements, “match-speciﬁc quality” and
“thick-market eﬀects.” We then show that the model can generate seasonal ﬂuctuations comparable
to those in the data.
4.1 The Model Economy
The economy is populated by a unit measure of inﬁnitely lived agents, who have linear preferences over
housing services and a non-durable consumption good. Each period agents receive a ﬁxed endowment
of the consumption good which they can either consume or use to buy housing services. An agent can
only enjoy housing services by living in one house at a time, that is, he can only be “matched” to one
house at a time. Agents who are not matched to a house seek to buy one (“buyers”).
There is a unit measure of housing stock. Correspondingly, each period a house can be either
matched or unmatched. A matched house delivers a ﬂow of housing services of quality ε to its owner.
The quality of housing services ε is match-speciﬁc, and it reﬂects the suitability of a match between a
house and its owner. In other words, for any house, the quality of housing services is idiosyncratic to
the match between the house and the potential owner. For example, a particular house may match a
buyer’s taste perfectly well, while at the same time being an unsatisfactory match to another buyer.
Hence, ε is not the type of house (or of the seller who owns a particular house). This is consistent
with our data, which control for houses’ characteristics, but not for the quality of a match.29
We assume that in a market with many houses for sale, a buyer is more likely to ﬁnd a better
match, what we refer to as the “thick-market eﬀect.” As in Diamond (1981), we model this idea by
assuming that the match-speciﬁc quality ε follows a distribution F (ε, v) , with positive support and
ﬁnite mean, and
F (., v′) ≤ F (., v)⇔ v′ > v, (1)
where v denotes the stock of houses for sales. In words, when the stock of houses v is larger, a
random match-quality draw from F (ε, v) is likely to be higher. The web Appendix provides detailed
29Repeat-sale indexes do not control for the quality of a match, which is not observed by data collectors.
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micro-foundations for this assumption.30
Unmatched houses are “for sale” and are owned by “sellers;” sellers receive a ﬂow u from any
unmatched house they own, where the ﬂow u is common to all sellers.
4.2 Seasons and Timing
There are two seasons, j = s, w (for summer and winter); each model period is a season, and the two
seasons alternate. At the beginning of a period j, an existing match between a homeowner and his
house breaks with probability 1 − φj, and the house is put up for sale, adding to the stock of houses
for sales, denoted by vj. The homeowner whose existing match has broken becomes simultaneously a
seller and a buyer, adding to the pool of buyers, denoted by bj. In our baseline model, the parameter
φj is the only (ex ante) diﬀerence between the seasons.31 We focus on periodic steady states with
constant vs and vw. Since a match is between one house and one agent, and there is a unit measure
of agents and a unit measure of houses, it is always the case that the mass of houses for sale equals
the mass of buyers: vj = bj.
Our objective is to investigate how such deterministic driver of seasonality can be ampliﬁed and
revealed as seasonality in transactions and prices in the housing market due to the thick-market eﬀects
on the match-speciﬁc quality. By focusing on the periodic steady-state, we are studying a deterministic
cycle and agents are aware that they are in such a cycle with φj, transactions, and prices ﬂuctuating
between high and low levels across the two seasons.
During each period, every buyer meets with a seller and every seller meets with a buyer. Upon
meeting, the match-speciﬁc quality between the potential buyer and the house is drawn from a distri-
bution F (ε, v) . If the buyer and seller agree on a transaction, the buyer pays a price (discussed later)
to the seller, and starts enjoying the housing services ε. If not, the buyer looks for a house again next
period, the seller receives the ﬂow u, and puts the house up for sale again next period.32 An agent can
hence be either a matched homeowner or a buyer, and, at the same time, he could also be a seller.
Sellers also may have multiple houses to sell.33
30Heuristically, one way to interpret our assumption is as follows. Suppose the buyer samples n units of vacant
houses when the stock of vacancies is v. As long as the number of units sampled n increases in v, the maximum match
quality ε in the sample will be “stochastically larger.” In other words, for any underlying distribution of match quality,
the distribution of the maximum in a sample of size n will ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate the distribution of the
maximum in a smaller sample n′ < n. As such, F can be interpreted as the distribution of the sample maximum. In
the web Appendix, we oﬀer rigorous micro-foundations for this assumption.
31This diﬀerence could be determined, for example, by the school calendar or summer marriages, among other factors,
exogenous to our model. In the web Appendix we discuss seasonal transaction costs as an alternative driver of seasonality.
32In the web Appendix we relax the assumption that if the transaction does not go through, the buyer and seller need
to wait for next period to transact with other agents.
33In the web Appendix, we show that the probability of owning multiple house is quantitatively small.
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4.3 The Homeowner
The value of living in a house with match quality ε starting in season s is given by:
Hs (ε) = ε+ βφwHw (ε) + β (1− φw) [V w +Bw] ,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. With probability (1 − φw) the homeowner receives a moving
shock and becomes both a buyer and a seller (putting his house up for sale), with continuation value
(V w+Bw), where V j is the value of a house for sale to the seller and Bj is the value of being a buyer in
season j = s, w, as deﬁned later. With probability φw the homeowner keeps receiving housing services
of quality ε and stays in the house. The formula for Hw (ε) is perfectly isomorphic to Hs (ε); in the
interest of space we omit here and throughout the paper the corresponding expressions for season w.
The value of being a matched homeowner can be therefore re-written as:
Hs (ε) =
1 + βφw
1− β2φwφs ε+
β (1− φw) (V w +Bw) + β2φw (1− φs) (V s +Bs)
1− β2φwφs , (2)
which is strictly increasing in ε. The ﬁrst term that enters the housing value Hs (ε) is the eﬀective
(adjusted for moving probabilities) present discounted value of staying in a house with match quality
ε and the second term contains the values in the event that the match may dissolve in any future
summer or winter.
4.4 Market Equilibrium
We focus on the case in which both seller and buyer observe the quality of the match, ε, which is
drawn from F j (ε) ≡ F (ε, vj); we derive the results for the case in which the seller cannot observe ε
in the web Appendix. If the transaction goes through, the buyer pays the seller a mutually agreed
price, and starts enjoying the housing services ﬂow in the same season j. If the transaction does not
go through, the buyer receives zero housing services and looks for a house again next season. This will
be the case, for example, if buyers searching for a house pay a rent equal to the utility they derive
from the rented property–what is key is that the rental property is not owned by the same potential
seller with whom the buyer meets. On the seller’s side, when the transaction does not go through, he
receives the ﬂow u in season j and puts the house up for sale again next season. The ﬂow u can be
interpreted as a net rental income received by the seller. Again, what is key is that the tenant is not
the same potential buyer who visits the house.
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4.4.1 Reservation Quality
The total surplus of a transaction is:
Ss (ε) = Hs (ε)− [β (Bw + V w) + u] . (3)
Intuitively, a new transaction generates a new match of value Hs (ε); if the transaction does not go
through, the buyer and the seller obtain βBw and (βV w + u), respectively. Since ε is observable and
the surplus is transferrable, a transaction goes through as long as the total surplus Ss (ε) is positive.
Given Hs (ε) is increasing in ε, a transaction goes through if ε  εs, where the reservation εs is deﬁned
by:
εs =: Hs (εs) = β (Bw + V w) + u, (4)
and 1− F s (εs) is thus the probability that a transaction is carried out. Since the reservation quality
εs is related to the total surplus independently of how the surplus is divided between the buyer and
the seller, we defer the discussion of equilibrium prices to Section 5.2. Using the expression of housing
value Hs (ε) in (2), equation (4) becomes:
1 + βφw
1− β2φwφs ε
s = u− β
2φw (1− φs)
1− β2φwφs (B
s + V s) +
1− β2φs
1− β2φwφsβφ
w (Bw + V w) . (5)
The Bellman equation for the sum of values is:
Bs + V s = β (Bw + V w) + u+ [1− F s (εs)]Es [Ss (ε) | ε  εs] , (6)
where Es [.] indicates the expectation is taken with respect to distribution F s (.) . The sum of values
in season s covers the outside option, β (Bw + V w)+u (the ﬂow u plus the option value of buying and
selling next season) and, with probability [1− F s (εs)] , on the expected surplus from a transaction for
sellers and buyers. Solving this explicitly and using the expression for Sj (ε) , j = s, w in (20):
Bs + V s =
u
1− β +
(1 + βφw)hs (εs) + β (1 + βφs)hw (εw)(
1− β2) (1− β2φwφs) , (7)
where hs (εs) ≡ [1− F s (εs)]E [ε− εs | ε  εs] is the expected surplus of quality above threshold εs.
The equilibrium values εs, εw, (Bs + V s) , and (Bw + V w) in (5) and (7) depend on equilibrium
vacancies vs and vw, which we now derive.
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4.4.2 Stock of houses for sale
In any season s, the law of motion for the stock of houses for sale (and for the stock of buyers) is
vs = (1− φs) [vw (1− Fw (εw)) + 1− vw] + vwFw (εw)
where the ﬁrst term corresponds to houses that received a moving shock and hence were put for sale
this season and the second term corresponds to vacancies from last period that did not ﬁnd a buyer.
The expression simpliﬁes to
vs = 1− φs + vwFw (εw)φs. (8)
The equilibrium quantities (Bs + V s, Bw + V w, εs, εw, vs, vw) jointly satisfy equations (5), (7), and
(8) together with the isomorphic equations for the other season. They are independent of how the total
surplus is shared across buyers and sellers, that is, independent of the exact price-setting mechanism.
We hence discuss seasonality in vacancies and transactions ﬁrst, before we specify the particular price-
setting mechanism.
5 Model-Generated Seasonality
In the baseline model seasonality is driven by the higher moving probability in the summer:
1−φs > 1−φw. As shown earlier, the equilibrium quantities (Bs + V s, Bw + V w, εs, εw, vs, vw) jointly
satisfy six equations. Before jumping directly to the quantitative results we discuss the underlying
mechanisms through which a higher probability of relocating in the summer leads to a larger stock of
vacancies and a higher expected return for buyers and sellers, i.e. vs > vw and Bs + V s > Bw + V w;
hence, this section aims at making the model’s mechanics more explicit.
It is important to reiterate that our notion of seasonality is not a cross-steady states comparison,
that is, we are not comparing a steady-state with a high probability of moving houses to another
steady-state with a low probability of moving. Instead, the seasonal values we derive are equilibrium
values along a periodic steady state where agents take into account that the economy is ﬂuctuating
deterministically between the summer and the winter seasons.
Using (8), the stock of houses for sale in season s is given by:
vs =
1− φs + φsFw (εw) (1− φw)
1− F s (εs)Fw (εw)φsφw . (9)
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The ex ante higher probability of moving in the summer (1−φs > 1−φw) clearly has a direct positive
eﬀect on vs, and this eﬀect also dominates quantitatively when we calibrate the model to match the
average duration of stay in a house.34 Thus, this implies vs > vw. The probability of moving is
exogenous in our model and we calibrate it so as to match the seasonality in vacancies. Our main
interest is to predict the seasonality in transactions and prices.
To that aim, we ﬁrst take a somewhat tedious but useful detour to comment on the seasonality
of the sum of values (Bj + V j) . Intuitively, a higher stock of vacancies in the summer implies higher
expected returns to a buyer and a seller in the summer because of better matches through the thick-
market eﬀect. These higher expected returns in the summer, however, also raise the outside options
of a buyer and a seller in the winter. Higher outside options make both the buyer and the seller more
demanding and tend to increase the reservation quality in the winter. In equilibrium, however, the
overall eﬀect on reservation quality is ambiguous.35 More formally, the higher stock of vacancies in the
summer, vs > vw, implies a higher expected surplus quality hs(.) for any given cutoﬀ through the thick-
market eﬀects as in (1).36 Given φw > φs, it thus follows from equation (7) that Bs + V s > Bw + V w
if the two equilibrium cutoﬀs εs and εw are close. In other words, the expected return (Bj + V j) is
higher in the summer as long as the thick-market eﬀect dominates a potentially oﬀsetting equilibrium
eﬀect from the reservation quality. Quantitatively, the two cutoﬀs turn out to be close for reasonable
parametrizations of the model and hence the thick-market eﬀect indeed dominates.
34More speciﬁcally, the numerator is a weighted average of 1 and Fw (εw) (1− φw) , with 1 − φs being the weight
assigned to 1 in the equation for vs. Since 1 − φs > 1 − φw, the equation for vs assigns a higher weight on 1. Since
Fw (εw) (1− φw) < 1, higher weight on 1 leads to vs > vw; this is because Fw (εw) (1− φw) is virtually aseasonal as
there are two opposite eﬀects: Fw (εw) > F s (εs) and (1− φw) < (1− φs) that tend to largely cancel each other.
35Note, using (4), that lower outside options (Bw + V w) imply a lower housing value for the marginal transaction in
the summer,
Hs (εs) < Hw (εw) . (10)
This does not necessarily imply a lower reservation quality in the summer, εs < εw because the ranking of Hs (ε) and
Hw (ε) depends on the level of ε. To see this, note from (2), that Hj (ε) is linear in ε for j = s, w. Given φw > φs, Hs (.)
is steeper than Hw (.) . The diﬀerence in the intercepts between Hs (.) and Hw (.) is proportional to:
β [(1− φw) (1− βφs) (Bw + V w)− (1− φs) (1− βφw) (Bs + V s) ] ,
which is negative when Bs+ V s > Bw + V w. Therefore, Hs (.) and Hw (.) must cross once at εˆ. Thus if the equilibrium
reservation quality in the summer is suﬃciently high, εs > εˆ, then Hs (εs) > Hw (εs) . Therefore, in order for inequality
(10) to hold, we must have εw > εs. In this case, a lower outside option in the summer leads to a lower cutoﬀ. On the
other hand, if the equilibrium reservation quality in the summer is suﬃciently low, εs < εˆ, then Hs (εs) < Hw (εs); in
this case, the inequality εw > εs is no longer required for inequality (10) to hold. In sum, the two equilibrium cutoﬀs
cannot be ranked.
36To see this, rewrite hs (x) =
∫
x
[1− F s (ε)] dε using integration by parts.
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5.1 Seasonality in Transactions
The number of transactions in equilibrium in season s is given by:
Qs = vs [1− F s (εs)] . (11)
(An isomorphic expression holds for Qw). From (11), it is evident that a larger stock of vacancies in the
summer, vs > vw, has a direct positive eﬀect on the number of transactions in the summer relative to
winter. Furthermore, if the probability of a transaction is also higher in the summer, then transactions
will be more seasonal than vacancies. This ampliﬁcation eﬀect, which follows from the ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance of F s (.) over Fw (.) , is indeed present in our quantitative exercise.37 Intuitively,
a higher stock of vacancies leads to better matches through the thick-market eﬀect, resulting in a
higher transaction probability.38
5.2 Seasonality in Prices
As discussed earlier, results on seasonality in vacancies and transactions are independent of the exact
price-setting mechanism, i.e. how the surplus is shared between a buyer and seller. Let Ssv (ε) and
Ssb (ε) be the surpluses of a transaction to the seller and to the buyer, respectively, in season s, when
the match quality is ε and the price is ps (ε):
Ssv (ε) ≡ ps (ε)− (u+ βV w) , (12)
Ssb (ε) ≡ Hs (ε)− ps (ε)− βBw. (13)
The value functions for the buyer and the seller in season s are, respectively:
V s = βV w + u+ [1− F s (εs)]Es [Ssv (ε) | ε  εs] , (14)
Bs = βBw + [1− F s (εs)]Es [Ssb (ε) | ε  εs] . (15)
37As said, there could be an additional eﬀect if the cutoﬀs are highly seasonal. For example, if εw > εs, there will be
even lower volume of transactions in the winter. This is because the outside option for both buyers and sellers is to wait
and transact in the next season. Therefore, a higher outside option in the winter makes both buyers and sellers more
demanding in the winter and hence less likely to transact, yielding an even smaller number of transactions.
38Our model predicts higher probability of transactions in the hot season, thus faster sale and shorter average time
on the market for both buyers and sellers. Though we do not have high-frequency data on time on the market to assess
seasonality, at lower frequencies, average time to sell tends to be shorter when prices are high (see Krainer, 2001 and
Diaz and Jerez, 2012), a relation that is consistent with our mechanism.
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A seller can count on his outside option, βV w + u (the ﬂow u plus the option value of selling next
season) and, with probability [1− F s (εs)], on the expected surplus from a transaction for sellers. A
buyer counts on her outside option, βBw (the option value of buying next season), and, with the same
probability, on the expected surplus for buyers. The two Bellman equations (14) and (15) describe the
incentives of buyers and sellers in any season s. They will only agree to a transaction if they obtain
a positive surplus from the exchange. In particular, (14) shows why a seller would agree to sell in
the winter season, even though the average price is higher in the summer. A positive surplus in the
winter, pw (ε) − (u+ βV s) > 0, already takes into account the potential higher price in the summer
and therefore the higher value of being a seller in the summer (V s) .
We now consider the case in which prices are determined by Nash bargaining. The price maximizes
the Nash product:
max
ps(ε)
[Ssv (ε)]
θ [Ssb (ε)]
1−θ s.t. Ssv (ε) , S
s
b (ε)  0;
where θ denotes the bargaining power of the seller. The solution implies
Ssv (ε)
Ssb (ε)
=
θ
1− θ , (16)
which simpliﬁes to (see web Appendix):
ps (ε) = θHs (ε) + (1− θ) u
1− β , (17)
a weighted average of the housing value for the matched homeowner and the present discounted value
of the ﬂow u. In other words, the price guarantees the seller the proceeds from the alternative usage
of the house ( u
1−β ) and a fraction θ of the social surplus generated by the transaction
[
Hs (ε)− u
1−β
]
.
The average price of a transaction is:
P s ≡ Es [ps (ε) | ε  εs] = (1− θ) u
1− β + θE
s [Hs (ε) | ε  εs] , (18)
which is increasing in the conditional expected surplus of housing services for transactions exceeding
the reservation εs. Since u is aseasonal, house prices are seasonal if θ > 0 and the surplus to the seller
is seasonal. Moreover, the extent of seasonality is increasing in θ. Intuitively, the source of seasonality
is coming from higher average match quality in a thicker market. The higher match quality generates
higher utility to the buyer. This will show up as a higher price only if the seller has some bargaining
power to extract a fraction of the surplus generated from the match. To see this in equations, rewrite
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Es [Hs (ε) | ε  εs] as the sum of two terms:
Es [Hs (ε) | ε  εs] = Hs (εs) + Es [Ss (ε) | ε  εs] . (19)
The ﬁrst term, Hj (εj) , the housing value of the marginal transaction, tends to reduce the average price
in the summer since Hs (εs) < Hw (εw) . The second term, Es [Ss (ε) | ε  εs] , is the expected surplus
of a transaction, which tends to increase the average price in the summer due to higher match-quality.
To see this second term more clearly, observe from (3) and (4) that
Ss (ε) = Hs (ε)−Hs (εs) = 1 + βφ
w
1− β2φwφs (ε− ε
s) , (20)
thus
Es [Ss (ε) | ε  εs] = 1 + βφ
w
1− β2φwφsE
s [ε− εs | ε  εs] .
The average housing value will thus be higher in the summer for two reasons. First, the probability of
staying is higher in the winter, φw > φs. Second, and more important, given the assumption of ﬁrst-
order stochastic dominance, a higher stock of vacancies vs > vw increases the likelihood of drawing
a higher match-quality [1− F s (ε)]  [1− Fw (ε)] ∀ε . This generally leads to a higher conditional
surplus in the hot season: Es [ε− εs | ε  εs]  Ew [ε− εw | ε  εw] .39
Given that θ aﬀects P s only through the equilibrium mass of vacancies (recall the reservation
quality εs is independent of θ), it follows that the extent of seasonality in prices is increasing in θ.
Since (18) holds independently of the steady state equation for vs and vw, this result is independent
of what drives vs > vw. Note ﬁnally that the extent of seasonality in prices is decreasing in the size of
the (aseasonal) ﬂow u.
39 To see this, rewrite the conditional surplus using integration by parts:
Es [ε− εs | ε  εs] =
∫
εs
(1− F s (ε)) dε
1− F s (εs) . (21)
Putting aside the issue of the equilibrium cutoﬀs εs and εw (which are are quantitatively close), it follows from equation
(21) that the conditional surplus is higher in the hot season, Es [ε− εs | ε  εs]  Ew [ε− εw | ε  εw] , unless the
increase in the likelihood of drawing a particular level of match quality ε dominates the sum of the increase in likelihood
of drawing all match qualities higher than ε, i.e. unless 1−F
s(ε)
1−Fw(ε) >
∫
ε
(1−F s(ε))dε∫
ε
(1−Fw(ε))dε . We cannot rule out this possibility in
general, but this case does not arise in our calibration exercise. More formally, we could impose a “uniform” stochastic
ordering (see Keilson and Sumita, 1982) as a suﬃcient condition to rule out this case. But as said, such assumption is
not necessary for obtaining higher prices in the hot season.
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5.2.1 Comparison to a Standard Asset-Pricing Approach
It is useful to compare the price mechanism in our setup with that in a standard asset pricing ap-
proach. Equation (14) can be compared to the no-arbitrage condition in asset pricing. Substituting
the expression for the surplus into (14), we obtain
V s = [1− F s (εs)]P s + F s (εs) (βV w + u)
The equation expresses the value of a seller as a weighted average of the market price P s and the
continuation value (βV w + u) , with the weights given, correspondingly, by the probabilities that the
transaction goes through or not. Without the search friction, a buyer will always purchase the house
at the market price P s, thus the probability of a transaction is one. In that case, the value for being
a seller is V s = P s. Moreover, the surplus of a transaction is zero in a competitive equilibrium (with
perfect arbitrage), so the Bellman equation (14) is equivalent to
P s = βPw + u = β (βP s + u) + u =⇒ P s = u
1− β ,
and P s = Pw. In other words, without the model’s friction, seasonality in moving probabilities φs will
not be transmitted into seasonality in prices.40
Our price index P j, j = s, w is the average price of transactions in season j. The seasonality in
price indexes, P s > Pw, is due to the thick market eﬀect, whereby matches are more likely to be better
in the hot season (with a higher stock of houses for sale). In what follows we focus on discussing
the mechanism from the seller’s perspective (a similar argument can be put forward from a buyer’s
perspective). The price index P j is not the price that every seller receives. More speciﬁcally, consider
a seller in the winter who is meeting with a buyer that has a match-speciﬁc quality equal to ε. He
has to decide whether to sell now at an agreed price or to wait until the summer, where the average
price is P s. Notice that the seller is not comparing Pw to P s in his decision because what is relevant
for him is not the average price Pw but rather pw (ε), which is determined between him and the buyer
40Notice that with the search friction, P s 	= u1−β . From
V s = βV w + u+ [1− F s (εs)]Es [Ssv (ε) | ε  εs]
substitute the expression for V w and obtain:
V s =
u
1− β +
[1− F s (εs)]Es [Ssv (ε) | ε  εs] + β [1− Fw (εw)]Ew [Swv (ε) | ε  εw]
1− β2
where the expected surpluses are strictly positive.
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with quality match ε. The equilibrium value functions (14) and (15) ensure that a transaction will
take place as long as the surplus is positive. The option of being able to sell at a possibly higher price
in the summer has already been incorporated into the equilibrium surpluses (12) and (13), which in
turn pin down the equilibrium price pw (ε) as in (17). So even though the price of a transaction for
a speciﬁc ε might be higher in the hot season, it does not follow that a seller will only transact in
the summer because of the stochastic nature of ε. By not transacting at pw (ε) , a seller may end up
with an even lower ps (ε˜) in the summer if he meets a buyer with a lower match quality ε˜, or with no
transaction at all if the match quality ε˜ is too low. So the corresponding arbitrage condition for the
seller to decide whether to wait until the hot season has to consider both the probability of transacting
in the summer and the distribution of the match quality conditional on transacting. In contrast, in a
standard asset-pricing model with deterministic seasons, a seller can always transact (with certainty)
at market prices. The choice of whether to sell in the current season or in the next depends exclusively
on the ﬂow of beneﬁts (or costs) of owning the house for one season relative to the expected seasonal
appreciation.
5.3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we calibrate the model to study its quantitative implications.
5.3.1 Parameter values
We assume the distribution of match-quality F (ε, v) follows a uniform distribution on [0, v] . When
vs > vw (which will follow from φw > φs), this implies ﬁrst-order stochastic ordering, F s (.)  Fw (.) .
We set the discount factor β so that the implied annual real interest rate is 6 percent, as calculated
by Blake (2011) for the United States. (The rate might be slightly higher for the United Kingdom,
though we use the same to ease cross-country comparability.)
We calibrate the average probability of staying in the house, φ = (φs + φw) /2, to match survey
data on the average duration of stay in a given house, which in the model is given by 1
1−φ . The median
duration in the United States from 1993 through 2005, according to the American Housing Survey, was
18 semesters; the median duration in the United Kingdom during this period, according to the Survey
of English Housing was 26 semesters. The implied (average) moving probabilities (1−φ) per semester
are hence 0.056 and 0.038 for the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. Because there
is no direct data on the ex-ante ratio of moving probabilities between seasons, (1− φs) / (1− φw), we
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use a range of (1− φs) / (1− φw) from 1.1 to 1.5.41 This implies a diﬀerence in staying probabilities
between seasons, φw−φs, ranging from 0.004 to 0.015 in the United Kingdom and 0.005 to 0.022 in the
United States. One way to pin down the level of (1− φs) / (1− φw) is to use data on inventories (or
homes for sale), which correspond to the vacancies vj in our model. The data are available at quarterly
frequency for the United States from the NAR (for the United Kingdom, data on vacancies only exist
at yearly frequency). Seasonality in inventories was 28 percent during 1991− 2012.42 As will become
clear from the results displayed below, the ratio that exactly matches seasonality in US vacancies is
(1− φs) / (1− φw) = 1.25. The reader may want to view this as a deep parameter and potentially use
it also for the UK, under the assumption that the extent of seasonality in ex-ante moving probabilities
does not vary across countries.
We calibrate the ﬂow value u to match the implied average rent-to-price ratio received by the seller.
In the UK, the average gross rent-to-price ratio is roughly around 5 percent per year, according to
Global Property Guide.43 For the US, Davis et al. (2008) argue that the ratio was around 5 percent
prior to 1995 when it started falling, reaching 3.5 percent by 2005. In our model, the u/P ratio (where
P stands for the average price, absent seasonality) corresponds to the net rental ﬂow received by the
seller after paying taxes and other relevant costs; it is accordingly lower than the gross rent-to-price
ratio. As a benchmark, we choose u so that the net rent-to-price ratio is equal to 3 percent per year
(or 1.5 percent per semester), equivalent to assuming a 40 percent income tax on rent).44 To obtain
the value of u, which, as we said, is aseasonal in the data, we use the equilibrium equations in the
model without seasonality, that is, the model in which φs = φw = φ. From (18) and (5), the average
41The two surveys mentioned also report the main reasons for moving. Around 30 percent of the respondents report
that living closer to work or to their children’s school and getting married are the main reasons for moving. These
factors are of course not entirely exogenous, but they can carry a considerably exogenous component; in particular, the
school calendar is certainly exogenous to housing market movements (see Goodman 1993 and Tucker, Long, and Marx
1995 on seasonal mobility). In all, the survey evidence supports our working hypothesis that the ex ante probability to
move is higher in the summer (or, equivalently the probability to stay is higher in the winter).
42We use the inventory series provided by NAR. As a measure of seasonality we use, as before, the diﬀerence in
annualized growth rates in vacancies between broadly deﬁned summers and winters. As an alternative deﬁnition of
vacancies we also looked at vacant houses’ data from the US Census Bureau. Vacancy is computed as the sum of houses
for sale at the beginning of the season relative to the stock of houses. The degree of seasonality in this series, using the
same metric is 31 percent.
43Data for the United Kingdom and other European countries can be found in
http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/United-Kingdom/price-rent-ratio
44In principle, other costs can trim down the 3-percent u/P ratio, including maintenance costs, and ineﬃciencies in
the rental market that lead to a higher wedge between what the tenant pays and what the landlord receives; also, it
might not be possible to rent the house immediately, leading to lower average ﬂows u. Note that lower values of u/p
lead to even higher seasonality in prices and transactions for any given level of seasonality in moving shocks.
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price and the reservation quality εd in the absence of seasonality are (see web Appendix):
P =
u
1− β + θ
[
1− βF (εd)]E [ε− εd | ε  εd]
(1− β) (1− βφ) , (22)
and
εd
1− βφ =
u+ βφ
1−βφ
∫
εd
εdF (ε)
1− βφF (εd) . (23)
We hence substitute u = 0.015 · P in the aseasonal model (equivalent to an annual rent-to-price ratio
of 3 percent) for θ = 1/2 (when sellers and buyers have the same bargaining power) and ﬁnd the
equilibrium value of P given the calibrated values for β and F (.) . We then use the implied value of
u = 0.015 · P as a parameter.45
Finally, in reporting the results for prices we vary the seller’s bargaining power parameter θ from
0 to 1.
5.3.2 The Extent of Seasonality
Given the calibrated values of u, β, and φ discussed above, Table 7 displays the extent of seasonal-
ity in vacancies and transactions generated by the model for diﬀerent values of the ratio of moving
probabilities (recall that seasonality in vacancies and transactions is independent of the bargaining
power of the seller, θ). As throughout the paper, our metric for seasonality is the annualized diﬀerence
in growth rates between the two seasons. Column (1) shows the ratio of moving probabilities, 1−φ
s
1−φw .
Columns (2) and (5) show the implied diﬀerence in moving probabilities between the two seasons for
the United States and the United Kingdom, [(1− φs)− (1− φw)]. (Recall that, because the average
stay in a house diﬀers across the two countries, a given ratio can imply diﬀerent values for φw − φs,
as the average probability of stay φ diﬀers.) Columns (3) and (4) show the extent of seasonality in
vacancies and transactions for an average stay of 9 years (as in the United States) and Columns (6)
and (7) show the corresponding ﬁgures for an average stay of 13 years (as in the United Kingdom)
45We also calibrated the model using diﬀerent values of u for diﬀerent θ (instead of setting θ = 1/2), keeping the ratio
u/P constant. Results are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent under this procedure, but the comparability of results for diﬀerent
values of θ becomes less clear, since u is not kept ﬁxed.
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Table 7. Seasonality in vacancies and transactions for diﬀerent 1−φ
s
1−φw .
Implied seasonal
difference  in
moving
probabilities
(2)
Vacancies
(3)
Transactions
(4)
Implied seasonal
difference  in
moving
probabilities
(5)
Vacancies
(6)
Transactions
(7)
1.10 0.005 12% 49% 0.004 11% 48%
1.20 0.010 23% 94% 0.007 21% 93%
1.25 0.012 28% 115% 0.009 25% 113%
1.30 0.014 33% 136% 0.010 30% 133%
1.40 0.019 42% 174% 0.013 38% 171%
1.50 0.022 51% 211% 0.015 45% 207%
Average moving probability:  0.0385
Stay of 13 years (U.K.)
Average moving probability:  0.0556
Stay of 9 years (U.S.)Ratio of
moving
probabilities
between
seasons
(1)
The ﬁrst point to note is the large ampliﬁcation mechanism present in the model: For any given
level of seasonality in vacancies, seasonality in transactions is at least four times bigger. Second, the
Table shows that a small absolute diﬀerence in the probability to stay between the two seasons can
induce large seasonality in transactions. Third, if we constrain ourselves to 1−φ
s
1−φw = 1.25 to match the
data on vacancies for the United States, this implies a level of seasonality in transactions of about
115 percent in the United States (the empirical counterpart is 146 percent). For the United Kingdom,
ideally we would like to recalibrate the ratio 1−φ
s
1−φw to match its seasonality in vacancies; however, as
said, the data are only available at yearly frequency. Using the same ratio 1−φ
s
1−φw = 1.25 as a parameter
for the United Kingdom would yield a seasonality in vacancies of 25 percent (the diﬀerence with the
United States is due to the longer duration of stay in the United Kingdom). This in turn would imply
a degree of seasonality in transactions of 113 percent (the empirical counterpart is 139.) Note that,
for a given ratio 1−φ
s
1−φw , the model generates more seasonality in transactions in the United States than
in the United Kingdom (as in the data) because a given ratio implies a higher diﬀerence in moving
probabilities [(1− φs)− (1− φw)] in the United States than in the United Kingdom, as the average
stay is shorter in the former.
Seasonality in prices, as expressed earlier, depends also on the bargaining power of the seller, θ.
Figure 7 plots the model-generated seasonality in prices for diﬀerent θ and 1−φ
s
1−φw , assuming an average
stay of 13 years (as in the United Kingdom), and Figure 8 shows the corresponding plot for an average
stay of 9 years (as in the United States). As illustrated, seasonality increases with both θ and 1−φ
s
1−φw .
If, as before, we take 1−φ
s
1−φw = 1.25 as given, the exercise implies that to match real-price seasonality in
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the United Kingdom (of about 5.5 percent), the bargaining power coeﬃcient θ needs to be around 0.8
percent. The corresponding value for the United States as a whole, with real-price seasonality of 4.8
percent, is 0.73 percent.46
Figure 7: Seasonality in Prices for Diﬀerent θ and 1−φ
s
1−φw . United Kingdom
Figure 8. Seasonality in Prices for Diﬀerent θ and 1−φ
s
1−φw . United States
In all, though stylized, the model can generate seasonal ﬂuctuations quantitatively comparable to
46A somewhat higher bargaining power of sellers in the United Kingdom appears plausible. First, population density
in the United Kingdom is higher than in the United States making land relatively scarcer, and potentially conferring
home owners more power in price negotiations (this should also be true in denser U.S. cities). Second, anecdotal evidence
suggests that land use regulations are particularly stringent in the United Kingdom (see OECD Economic Outlook 2005).
Finally, as discussed earlier, price seasonality in U.S. cities is positively correlated with price-to-rent ratios (which, within
the model, increases with sellers’ power).
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those in the data. Together with the results from our study of alternative models in the web Appendix
and the micro evidence supporting the mechanism, we conclude that thick-market eﬀects on quality
oﬀer a plausible explanation for the seasonal patterns in the data.
6 Concluding Remarks
Using data from the United Kingdom and the United States, this paper documents seasonal booms
and busts in housing markets. It argues that the predictability and high extent of seasonality in house
prices cannot be quantitatively reconciled with existing models in the housing literature.
To explain the empirical patterns, the paper presents a search-and-matching model emphasizing
two elements of the housing market. The ﬁrst is a match-speciﬁc component: buyers have diﬀerent
idiosyncratic preferences over houses. The second is the notion that in a market with more houses for
sale, a buyer is more likely to ﬁnd a better match, which we refer to as the thick-market eﬀect. With
these two elements, the model generates an ampliﬁcation mechanism such that a small (deterministic)
diﬀerence in the propensity to relocate across seasons can result in large seasonal swings in house
prices and the volume of transactions. When calibrated using data from the United States and the
United Kingdom, the model can quantitatively account for most of the seasonal ﬂuctuations in prices
and transactions observed in the data. The idea that matches formed in the summer are of better
quality–the idea underlying the model’s mechanism–is consistent with empirical evidence presented
in the paper.
The model sheds light on a new mechanism governing ﬂuctuations in housing markets that is also
likely to operate at lower frequencies. In particular, the thick-market eﬀect at the core of the model’s
propagation mechanism does not depend on the frequency of the shocks. Lower frequency shocks
associated with either business-cycle shocks of with less frequent booms and busts in housing markets
could also be propagated through the same mechanism to amplify ﬂuctuations in transactions and
prices.
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